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The importance of peer review in the field of digital forensics cannot be underestimated as it often forms
the primary, and sometimes only form of quality assurance process an organisation will apply to their
practitioners' casework. Whilst there is clear value in the peer review process, it remains an area which is
arguably undervalued and under-researched, where little academic and industrial commentary can be
found describing best practice approaches. This work forms the first of a two part series discussing why
the digital forensics discipline and its organisations should conduct peer review in their laboratories,
what it should review as part of this process, and how this should be undertaken. Here in part one, a
critical review of the need to peer review is offered along with a discussion of the limitations of existing
peer review mechanisms. Finally, the ‘Peer Review Hierarchy’ is offered, outlining the seven levels of peer
review available for reviewing practitioner findings.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
It goes without saying that any form of evidence entering a
criminal justice system must be reliable if it is to be used as part of
any legal decision making (Ivanovic, 2019). Whilst this may seem a
simple concept, in reality achieving this is a challenge, which has
led to recent scrutiny of all forensic science sub-disciplines (Hamer
and Edmond, 2019; Roux, 2019). Forensic science as a whole is
littered with examples of miscarriages of justice (Hamer and
Edmond, 2019) and examples of unsafe evidence making it to
trial (see Smit et al.‘s., 2018 review of cases in England and Wales).
Given the importance and power of forensic evidence in criminal
cases, this remains a deeply unsatisfactory position that forensic
science finds itself in, and in England and Wales the Forensic Sci-
ence Regulator has voiced such concerns (Tully, 2019, 2020).
Whilst the wider forensic community maintains its own set of
issues, focus here is maintained on the digital forensic (DF) arena.
Whilst there are arguably fewer high-profile documented examples
of the poor practices leading to miscarriages, as digital evidence
continues to feature prominently in many criminal investigations,
entering legal systems from a range of investigative authorities andrsman), nina.sunde@phs.no
Ltd. This is an open access article ua diverse set of devices, it is arguably only a matter of time before
similar is witnessed. As a result, it is important that the field of DF
does not mimic the mistakes of other forensic sub-disciplines and
fail to assess the reliability of the work its practitioners produce to a
sufficient, robust standard (Page et al., 2019). Whilst it remains easy
to make such a statement regarding the need to ensure measures
for determining reliability are in place, how we validate the quality
of this evidence has and continues to remain one of the greatest
challenges that the DF field will face, and is arguably yet to be
satisfactorily addressed Horsman, 2020.
ISO 9000:2015 (EN) (International Organization of
Standardization, 2015) section 3.6.2 defines quality as the “degree
to which a set of inherent characteristics of an object fulfils re-
quirements”, where object means anything perceivable or
conceivable - for example a product, service, process, person,
organisation, system or resources. It is also useful to distinguish
between two different dimensions of quality management: Quality
Assurance (QA), and Quality Control (QC) QA is a preventative en-
terprise, which is focused on ensuring that quality requirements
will be fulfilled (Doyle, 2019). QC is reactive, and focused on con-
trolling that quality requirements have been fulfilled (Doyle, 2019).
In DF, essential to the assessment of evidence ‘quality’ are the di-
mensions of validity and reliability associated with the human or
tool/technology based methods used, and the end result. Hand
(2004) describes reliability in the scientific sense as how different
observers measure or score the same phenomenon differently, andnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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depending on the type of observation. Validity could be described
as “the overall probability of reaching the correct conclusion, given
a specific method and data” (Christensen et al., 2014, p. 124). In
turn, reliability is a multi-factored construct, despite the term is
often used as an umbrella kite-mark. In reality, reliability covers the
overall worth of a piece of evidence but this overall worth consists
of three sub-areas; the reliability of the investigatory processes
undertaken; the reliability of practitioner interpretation and the
reliability of the practitioner's ability to convey this information to
their target audience. Whilst the reliability of evidence will be
assessed at its point of entry into any legal process, it should also be
assessed when in the laboratory environment. The advantages of
reliability checks at this point are as follows:
1. Cost saving: Problemswith findings which are established at this
stage mean that the costing implications with initiating legal
proceedings is prevented.
2. Damage limitation: Limiting potential damage to the practitioner
and organisational reputations.
3. Safeguard the rule of law: Preventing misleading or erroneous
information being used in trial proceedings.
Ensuring evidence reliability and validity is the job of the
investigating practitioner, supported by their organisation. Whilst
this may seem straightforward, the fact that there are currently few
formalised and standardisedmethods for assessing the reliability of
digital forensic evidence in the laboratory environment means that
achieving this is difficult. For most (if not all), lab-based peer-re-
view is the primary source of quality control and evidence reli-
ability checks for practitioner work, and it rightly should be as peer
reviews are a known technique for reducing errors (Keim, 2003).
Yet the problem remains that there are few, if any available re-
sources discussing how to conduct a DF peer review and what the
process should involve. As a result, it is likely that peer review
approaches are divergent between organisations suggesting that
the quality and robustness of such peer reviews may also vary.
Ineffective peer review in DF has been noted for over 15 years
(Meyers and Rogers, 2004) and if the field is to secure its status as
an important and reliable forensic science, it must take steps to-
wards rigorous peer review procedural development.
Based on information collected during the assessment of ISO/IEC
17025 accredited DF units in England and Wales undertaken by
United Kingdom Accreditation Service, Tully et al. (2020) conclude
that standards are no absolute guarantee for quality, noted below.
“A wide range of technical, administrative and management
findings were raised, demonstrating that the accreditation
process is addressing the provision of digital forensics services
as a system and not concentrating on a single element, such as
the technical examination of an item. No matter how skilled the
examiner, if he or she is not supported with the requisite
equipment, resources and ongoing training, the system will not
function as it should.” (Tully et al., 2020 p. 9).
This article forms the first in a two part series discussing peer
review in the field of DF. These pieces will provide the following
narratives:
- Part 1: Why the DF field should peer review, discussing sources
of error and peer review concepts, strengths and weaknesses.
- Part 2:What and how the DF field should peer review, where the
Phase-oriented Advice and Review Structure (PARS) for digital
forensic investigations is offered and described. The available2
options to ease the implementation into existing practices are
also discussed (Sunde and Horsman, 2020).
Peer review for DF investigations is an under researched area
and is yet to be formally addressed and evaluated by the commu-
nity for scrutiny. Through this series of papers covering this topic
area we provide the first formalised set of focused discussions on
this topic and the first documented peer reviewmodel for use in DF
investigations. Part 1 commences with a discussion of the two
sources-types of error that can occur in a DF investigation, technical
and non-technical. The need for peer review, Problems with it and
the forms it can take are then described in Section 3 along with the
‘peer review hierarchy’, which denotes seven levels of peer review.
Finally, we posit the requirement for peer review as part of all DF
investigation processes, paving the way for the PARS model to be
outlined and discussed in Part 2.
2. Error in DF investigations
No tool, process, technique or practitioner can guarantee error
free results over a course of time, hence the importance of pro-
cesses designed to check such work. Yet before considering the
details of peer review and its importance, it is first necessary to
identify the sources of error which can exist in a DF investigation.
Error sources can be separated into two main categories: ‘technical
sources of error’ and ‘non-technical sources of error’, with each
described in turn below. It is important to highlight that when
discussions around peer review occur, there is an assumption that it
is the human who is subject to review, but such a view is too nar-
row. Error sources include erroneous tool outputs, potential bias,
oversight and pressure from external influences (Welner et al.,
2014) and it is necessary to address each in turn and ensure that
such checks incorporate this into a review. We acknowledge that
errors may happen as a result of a deliberate action made with bad
intent, however, have no reason to believe that this is a major
problem area in DF and will focus on unintended errors in the
further sections.
2.1. Technical sources of error
In line with the Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence
(SWGDE, 2018), errors linked to DF tools and technology usage can
be placed into three categories: techniques, implementation error,
and tool usage and interpretation error (SWGDE, 2018):
1. Techniques: Errors which can be attributed to techniques (al-
gorithms) are those which may occur randomly where the po-
tential exists to calculate their occurrence via error rates
(SWGDE, 2018). However, the use and value of error rates in
relation to DF tools and techniques is not straightforward.
Calculating an error rate requires a ‘population’ (a set of known
documented data depicting a specific technique's behaviour),
and due to the rapid technology development, as well as the
complexity and diversity of devices and technology this is not
always viable to achieve, and therefore in many cases may not
actually be possible.
2. Implementation error: Implementation of the algorithms in tools
may lead to systematic errors, since they are logical flaws that
will repeat themselves. Implementation errors are those which
occur due to issues during the tool or techniques development.
It is perhaps in this category easier to consider the example of a
forensic software package. During the development and testing
phase, it is possible that any given tool does not leave the
developer being wholly error-free, and this is often raised in the
tool's end-user license agreement (EULA) (Horsman, 2019,
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sub-categories:
i. Incompleteness: All available information that should be
identified by the tool (taking into account what the tool
states it does) is not. It is important here to make sure that
errors caused by misuse of a tool are not confused with
implementation errors.
ii. Inaccuracy: The tool should not report artifacts that do not
exist, group unrelated items together or alter data in a way
that changes its meaning.
iii. Misinterpretation: The results have been incorrectly under-
stood by the tool.
3. Tool usage and interpretation of results: This category also relates
to errors associated with humanetechnology interaction. Even
in cases where a tool is functioning correctly (having been
tested), usage errors can still occur where a practitioner incor-
rectly operates a tool, or when using the tool for a task it was not
designed to handle. Interpretation error may occur because of
ambiguities in the way the tool presents the data.
Technical sources of error are important to consider and guard
against, as there can be a perceived consensus that the tools
practitioners pay for should not, and therefore are not, prone to
error. As a result, under this belief it may be easy to see how errors
occurring from such a source may not be considered by review
systems.
2.2. Non-technical sources of error
In addition to those issues noted above, random mistakes and
systematic errors are a risk factor of any process and should also be
of concern. Errors of this type are difficult to guard against as they
may appear in any part of the investigatory process and potentially
in areas where there is a perceived expectation that the practitioner
would perform error free, making the need for review processes
great. As a result, it should not be assumed that just because a task
may be viewed as ‘simple’, that it should not also be scrutinised for
the potential of errors. Systematic errors should be a bigger concern
as they inherently repeat themselves and may be an indication of
flawed investigatory or organisational procedures, or thought
processes. The following sources of non-technical error are
proposed:
Knowledge: As in any discipline, knowledge is often involved in
the presence of errors in work. Whilst knowledgeable practitioners
are not infallible to error, those which have wide encompassing
knowledge of their craft are arguably in a better position to prevent
errors occurring. Conversely, those practitioners who lack knowl-
edge in specific areas may be more at risk of errors. This raises the
issue of ensuring that practitioners know and understand the remit
of their expertise and no not supersede this without specific
training and support. The problem this causes is that due to the
pace of technological change, it is common for practitioners to
encounter data types that they have not seen before but are ex-
pected to interpret accurately.
Experience: Linked closely with knowledge, experience is an
important aspect for error mitigation. Practitioners who can call
upon previous experiences and knowledge may be in a position to
do this in order to prevent future error. Where a practitioner has
seen a previous comparable investigative scenario and learned
from this, specifically if previous errors were made, then repetition
of erroneous practice is arguably less likely. This typically takes into
consideration the old adage of ‘learning from one's past experi-
ences'. In comparison, inexperienced practitioners may not be in a
position to draw upon such experiences.
Lack of procedures: Digital Forensics is characterized by a set of3
well known principles, such as maintaining evidence integrity and
chain of custody (Casey, 2011; Årnes, 2018), or as stated in ISO/IEC
27037:2012 (EN) - auditability, justifiability and repeatability/
reproducibility (International Organization of Standardization,
2012). However, these principles do not give any guidance in how
the tasks in the DF process should be performed. Research in expert
performance has suggested that procedures and checklists are
important tools for error mitigation. Research from the medical
domain showed that by introducing checklists on a few and well-
known steps for prevention of infections (e.g. wash hands, clean-
ing the skin with chlorhexidine, removing unnecessary catheters)
had a profound effect on the infection rate - it was nearly elimi-
nated during the period of the study (Pronovost et al., 2006). What
should be noticed is that the errors were not due to lack of
knowledge. Themedical personnel knew very well that they should
wash their hands and sterilize the skin before inserting a catheter.
The checklist was to avoidmistakes that could happen for a number
of reasons, such as time pressure or inattention due to distractions -
regardless of level of expertise. Checklists should therefore not be a
substitute for knowledge - but should be aimed at underpinning
expert performance and reducing the risk of mistakes.
Subjectivity and interpretation: Every process that involves a
human is prone to human error, and particularly when the process
involves subjectivity, interpretation, judgements and decisions.
These factors are relevant to every phase of the digital forensic
process. Examples of human errors include finding false negatives -
where a practitioner does not find what is actually there, or finding
false positives - where a practitioner finds/sees something that is
actually not present. Every practitioner maintains the potential to
misinterpret the meaning of a given set of evidential data. When
concluding or presenting the evidence there remains a risk of
overstating (or understating) the relevance or reliability of any
given evidential findings.
Cognitive bias: Systematic errors caused by cognitive bias are
identified as a problem across forensic science as a whole, influ-
encing observations and decisions. Nakhaeizadeh et al (2014, p.
208) state “research has shown that decision-making can be
influenced by cognitive processes and cause forensic experts to
modify their judgement”. The field of DF is not immune to such
issues and therefore issues around cognitive biases errors are of
equal importance in this domain. Dror (2017) described a seven
level taxonomy of factors that could lead to bias, and recently added
an additional eight level (Dror, 2020). The taxonomy involves fac-
tors related to human nature, environment, culture and experience
and case specific factors.
It is important to notice that this is about cognitive bias, which is
not about errors related to bad ethics or bad intentions or incom-
petence. These are biases which are mostly unconscious processes,
which happens with experts as well as novices. A global survey
among trained professionals in several forensic science disciplines
suggests a bias blind spot, which entails that they tend to recognise
biases in others, but deny the existence of those same biases in
themselves (Kukucka et al., 2017). This survey also showed a limited
understanding for how to effectively mitigate cognitive bias. 71%
believed that bias could be reduced by simply trying to ignore their
expectations.
While bias in forensic sciencework has been subject to research,
the problem of cognitive bias in DF investigations is not yet
explored with empirical research. Drawing on findings from other
forensic science domains, identified that all the levels, in what was
then a seven level taxonomy, are relevant in DF. While there is
subjectivity, choice and interpretation in all the phases of the DF
process, none of the phases should be considered secure from
human error caused by cognitive bias.
In addition, there are several situational factors that may lead to
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the concern for future consequences (Ask, 2013).
1. Pressure: The pressures of the DF practitioner's role can, and
often are, great. In most cases a practitioner will manage mul-
tiple cases at once, dealing with the competing demands of their
clients and their employing organisation. Often, time re-
quirements will be placed upon any given examination, whether
that be costed-time (the amount of time a practitioner is ‘billed’
to work on a case) or if in the criminal sphere, schedules court
dates may dictate approaches. In either case, the practitioner
does not have an infinite amount of time to complete their
investigation allowing an examination of every file present
(Pollitt, 2008), instead they will be faced with pressures to
complete work within specific time frames, which can be
pressure-inducing. Time-pressure is also a recognised risk factor
for cognitive bias (Ask, 2006).
2. Emotions: DF practitioners often handle material that may affect
them emotionally. Carrying out examinations with for example
child sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA) material may lead to
frustration, sorrow and anger, or a feeling of personal re-
sponsibility for the outcome of the investigation. These emo-
tions may bias the observations and conclusions of the
practitioner (Ask, 2013).
3. Peer review
The importance of peer review in forensic science cannot be
understated (Heilbrun et al., 2004), and the peer review of practi-
tioner case work should be sought in every instance (Cohen, 2010).
When discussing what science is, Doyle (2019 p.2) argues that
“review by an expert of at least equal standing is a minimum
requirement for the enquiry to qualify as scientific”. It forms part of
the expert evidence admissibility tests seen in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., 516 U S. 869 (U S. 1995) (sometimes referred to as the
Daubert Test or Daubert Standard) in the United States (Jonakait,
1993; Meyers and Rogers, 2005). Peer review is one of the main
mechanisms for vetting work for errors and to correct these where
present (Sims et al., 2013) indicating that ‘inadequate performance
in forensic work can be monitored and corrected by implementa-
tion of a program of peer review’ (Appelbaum,1992). Peer review is
also one of the best ways to overcome and prevent potential biases
in judgment which a practitioner may have made (Budowle et al.,
2009) and facilitate continual ‘quality improvement’ (Obenson
and Wright, 2013). Therefore through the integration of peer re-
viewers', complementary expertise and experience enhances the
sophistication and overall quality of assessment (Welner et al.,
2014)’. Perhaps the need for peer review is best offered by Wel-
ner et al (2012, p.1)
“Peer-reviewed forensic science is an important methodological
solution for ineffective and unethical forensic science assess-
ment, promoting integrity, quality, and confidence in justice”
(Welner et al., 2012, p.1).
Regardless of the discipline, the aims of peer review, which are
threefold, largely remains the same:
1. To uncover and correct errors in any current case subject to
review.
2. To assess the reliability of any given investigation and results.
Where errors are not found to be present, peer review acts as a
quality ‘kite-mark’ and reassurance that no errors are present,
not just because they have been missed, but that the work is
confirmed as being error free.4
3. To improve the quality of future work by offering learning ex-
periences. Errors may be systematic or random, and peer review
is relevant to address both, highlighting weaknesses in labora-
tory processes. Identifying bad practice means that it can be
addressed before it compromises further activities.
In relation to the DF field, the need for peer review is no
different to traditional forensic science types; the mechanism must
be viewed as a mandatory element of the DF investigatory process.
In part, this is due to the diversity and complexity of digital evi-
dence types which may occur, where drawing reference to other
investigators sciences may provide an illustrative example.
Horsman (2019) compares fingerprint analysis to that of a DF
investigation to highlight the differences in both investigative
procedures, where this example can be taken further here. Where
fingerprints are lifted from a source, this may in some cases be
carried out using a single process (examples include gel lifting or
powder and photograph with light source) followed by a ‘match-
analysis’ carried out by the practitioner and any supporting match
databases to link the print to a suspect. The point is that the peer
review of the methodology aspect of the investigation is somewhat
simple due to the linear approach - identify print - > capture
and lift - > analyse. Comparatively, a DF practitioner may
utilise multiple tools within any single examination, followed by
any number of features within that tool - each capable of being
configured incorrectly, misunderstood by the practitioner or per-
forming erroneously. Therefore any one DF examination may
contain multiple processes being run by a practitioner, each
requiring review and validation and as a result, the review process
is potentially exponentially greater in size as the amount of tasks
where errors may occur are greater in number. It is argued that the
scope for undetected error is greater in DF due to the amount of
components that are involved in a typical process.
When considering the need for peer review, it would seem to be
an obvious solution yet it is not without its issues.
3.1. Peer review and its problems
Generally, criticisms of peer review often stem from its use in
academic publishing contexts (Smith, 1988; Daniel at al., 2007;
Henderson, 2010), and many of these Problems overlap with the
use of peer review in the context of forensic science. The following
are avenues often raised as weaknesses of peer review, placed in
the context of its implementation in DF.
We don't know if it is being done at all in organisations: Perhaps
one of the biggest issues we have is that the DF field currently does
not know what every organisation is doing as part of their quality
management processes. Whilst it is assumed that peer review is
currently the primary method for detection unreliable work, at this
moment there is no consensus as to whether peer review is even
carried out in every organisation. If we assume that any form of
peer review is better than none, an initial position requires a
declaration from all organisations to state that as part of case re-
view processes, work undergoes review before leaving the confines
of their laboratory.
We don't know how it is being done: If an assumption is made that
peer review is taking place within organisations, then it is likely
that different organisations will be approaching this task differ-
ently. The lack of a defined peer review standard means that it is
currently unknown as to what shape and form a peer review in DF
currently takes.
We don't know at what stage a review is occurring: The investi-
gatory process in DF is multifaceted meaning that any peer review
process should arguably take this into account. It is assumed that if
peer review takes place at present, it is likely that this task is one
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approach at first glance, but the problem this raises if that Problems
which are detected at this point may be substantial to address and
earlier errors may compound issues later down the line. This raises
the question as to when the best time to initiate a peer review is
and whether the review itself is not singular in nature, but a pro-
cesses with multiple steps to it.
We don't know what a review ‘contains’: One of the Problems
with peer review in this context lies with what the review itself
should contain. In essence, what questions must the reviewer ask
and what issues must the investigating practitioner address in or-
der to convey reliance in their given evidence. Whilst arguably the
content of the review will be dependent on the context of a given
case, the goal in all cases is the same; to demonstrate reliability.
How this is achieved through review is yet to be defined.
We don't know who is reviewing: A key task in any peer review is
the allocation of an effective peer reviewer. This is even more
challenging in the laboratory environment which likelymaintains a
relatively small demographic of people to choose from who most
likely vary in experience and knowledge. Effective peer review
hinges on the ability of the reviewer and therefore the review of
complex casework by a junior colleague who has never witnessed
such work before may not achieve the required level of rigor. There
remains a real risk that in some organisations and laboratories, the
current mix of staffing abilities may prevent effective peer review
from taking place.
We don't know how practitioners respond to a review: Similar to
issues relating to what an effective peer review looks like, we also
maintain Problems as what an effective peer review response
should be. The obvious answer is a response, which passes all of the
challenges to evidence reliability offered as part of the review, yet
this may not always be straight forward. Essentially a review pro-
cess must consider when to determine an effective response has
been received from the peer review process, what an effective
response is, and, most problematic, what to do when an issue as
part of peer review is raised but has not or cannot be addressed.
We don't know the level of depth involved with a review:
Consideration must be given as to the depth of analysis undertaken
as part of the review process. Approaches such as ‘fact checking’ vs.
procedural repeating for validation purposes both carry different
advantages and disadvantages. This issue is discussed further in
Section 3. Interviews in a study with Norwegian DF practitioners
sheds some light to this challenge (Sunde, 2017). The DF practi-
tioners were asked about how quality checks of reports were done,
and told that they would routinely read and assess each other's
reports, but they had no template or list of criteria to refer to. Their
feedback to the author would therefore depend on the reviewers
ability, motivation and knowledge.
Peer review training: Given the importance of peer review, this
process should be treated with equal importance to all other as-
pects of a forensic investigation. Sufficient training is required in
order to become a competent peer reviewer and to recognise what
one looks like. Training ensures peer reviews are appropriatewhere
a non-effective peer review risks being of even greater detriment
by giving a stronger perception that work is reliable just because it
has been checked. It is worth noting that being taught to peer re-
view may not be commonly part of forensic science practitioner
training and therefore given the importance of peer review, it is
suggested that this become part of syllabuses going forward.
Peer reviewing must be efficient: Whilst this may seem contrary
to the purpose and nature of a peer review, it is important that the
peer review process is efficient. Peer review mechanisms that are
over-burdensome risk disengagement from staff in the laboratory
environment. There is a trade-off to be struck between a robust
review and one that fits the needs of the organisation.5
Peer reviewer experience: The experience of the peer reviewer
has been previously mentioned and this raises questions as to what
happens when there is not the experience in a lab setup to un-
dertake a peer review and how this can be overcome.
Evaluating a peer review: Whilst the peer review is designed to
evaluate a set of results, the peer review itself should be evaluated
for quality. Any peer review process should have mechanisms in
place to identify poor peer reviewing.
Problems with self-regulating: The problem most laboratories
will have lies with self-regulation - peer review of their staff will
take place using their staff. While each individual is their own
entity, they will be shaped by common internal procedures and
processes. Therefore, the risk of complacency and bias as part of a
review may be an issue.
Emotional side of peer review: Peer review is designed to scru-
tinise and evaluate. However, we do not know the impact on the
review when a reviewer does not want to criticize colleagues, or
feel uncomfortable to do so?
Ameaningful task: Whilst the concept of a peer review should be
viewed as useful by anyone operating in any discipline of forensic
science, in reality it may not always be fully engaged with. Given
that peer reviewing is an additional workload burden, how do we
make it a task which does not allow a practitioner to just ‘go
through the motions’ and tick boxes. In essence, the peer review
must be a meaningful task.
Evidence too complex to review, requiring re-examination: This
issue is more likely to arise in complex, multi-exhibit investigations
where the type and volume of evidence may be such a level of
complexity and volume that it becomes difficult to validate prac-
titioners interpretation and procedures without having undertaken
the same work again. Whilst controversial to suggest, peer review
may not be suited to every investigatory instance where depending
on those factors noted above and the severity of a suspected
offence. It may be of less risk to repeat the work where the impact
of error may be seen as too severe to risk standard peer reviews as
the only method of detecting them.
Acceptance of review results by the reviewee: In essence, the
principle concern here is ‘will the recipient of a peer review be
receptive to the results of a peer review, and if not - what happens
when a dispute arises?’ Therefore it is important that consideration
must not just be given to developing a system of peer review, but
how it is managed taking into account the need for dispute reso-
lution in some instances.
We don't know the effect of the evidential status ‘peer reviewed’:
Peer review is concerned with verifying the results of an investi-
gation. Yet those involved later in the judicial chain do not have the
same prerequisite to assess the quality of the evidence. They often
lack the competency to ask the right questions concerning the
reliability of the process of producing the evidence and the validity
of the result - and would probably trust the outcome of a peer
review. The problem is that if the peer review is by now a non-
standardized process, which may vary from reading through the
report looking for bad spelling and grammar errors, to a full re-
examination of the evidence files. This entails that the report sta-
tus ‘peer reviewed’ may be associated with verification of all the
findings through a high quality process, while the truth sometimes
may be a brief check of the report. A non-standardized and non-
transparent peer review process may therefore add another layer
of trust to the evidence, instead of providing insight into the actual
quality and probative value of the evidence.
3.2. Forms of peer review in DF
Peer review is mentioned or described in several standards
relevant to DF, such as ISO/IEC 17020:2012, ISO/IEC 17025:2017 and
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Standardization, 2012, 2013, 2017). Watson and Jones (2013) pre-
sent a list of questions to support an administrative review (p. 192)
as well as a technical peer review of the case (p. 406e407). The
questions are general, and referring to expressions, which may be
open to interpretation if not specified. For example “is the deliv-
erable (report, statements, depositions, etc.) accurate” and “were
the methods used appropriate” (Watson and Jones, 2013 p. 407).
While standards may provide useful guidance for peer review,
they are often behind paywalls. We have searched for detailed
descriptions of peer review in digital forensics that are publicly
available. ENFSI (2015 p. 16) underlines the importance of peer
review “to ensure the strength and provenance of the details being
assessed”, and highlight the importance of independence and suf-
ficient competence when assigning a reviewer. A template for peer
review of reports is provided (ENFSI, 2015, Appendix G, G.3), and,
similar to the lists provided by Watson and Jones (2013) contains
quite general descriptions of what the technical peer review should
focus on, for example,“have the appropriate examination been
carried out?” and “was the analysis proportionate?” (ENFSI, 2015 p.
62).
In 2019, Page et al. considered the structure and content of an
effective peer review for a DF organisation, noting down five levels,
notably the ‘proof check’, ‘sense review’, ‘conceptual peer review’,
‘verification review’ and ‘re-examination’. This work absorbs these
levels as a foundation for discussion and elaborates further on each
of these review types, whilst also extending the forms of peer re-
viewwhich can be opted for in DF. A proposed extension is made to
Page et al.'s (2019) work, which is formalised in our ‘Peer Review
Hierarchy’, shown in Fig. 1, and discussed below.
Fig. 1 provides for seven levels of peer review, organized hier-
archically where it is considered levels 1e3 are less likely to detect
critical errors in any investigation, but the implementation of these
peer review-types is less resource intensive as they focus on eval-
uating the presentation of reported work. In comparison, peer re-
views at levels 4e7 begin to evaluate and interpret the findings of
reported work, inevitably a more resource intensive process due to
the level of required scrutiny, naturally increasing the chance of
critical error detection. We consider the boundary between level 3Fig. 1. The ‘peer review
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and 4 to be the point in the peer review hierarchy where the review
moves from evaluating the appearance of work, to evaluating its
substance.
The first point of note and deviation from Page et al (2019, p. 89)
is the inclusion of an ‘administrative check’, considered here as a
level 1. Second, Page et al.'s (2019, p. 89) ‘verification review’ has
been split into two separate review types, a ‘sampled verification
review’, and a ‘full verification review’. As a result, there are seven
proposed peer review types, which a DF organisation may choose
to implement.
The hierarchical nature of the types of peer review shown in
Fig. 1 are likely to have an unsurprising impact on both their chance
of detecting error and the amount of time and effort it takes to
conduct the review itself. In essence, the distinguishing factors
between each review type is the amount of scrutiny applied at each
level, and the amount of organisational resources it will take to
carry out this task. Perhaps the best example to demonstrate this is
a direct comparison between a level 2 ‘proof check’ which may
identify grammatical and typographical errors in a practitioners
report, and a level 7 ‘re-examination’, which could discover pro-
cedural flaws and misinterpretation of evidence (critical errors).
The obvious problem here is that whilst a proof check may take an
hour of the reviewer's time, a re-examination could take days. As a
result, there is a trade-off which an organisation must make be-
tween the pursuit of robust quality control, and the feasibility of
carrying out a peer review.
A divide is placed between levels 1e3 and levels 4e7 dis-
tinguishing reviews which focus purely on the presentation of a
practitioners report (levels 1e3) and those which begin to scruti-
nise the investigatory work which has been undertaken (levels
4e7). It should also be noted that as the review types are structured
hierarchically, tasks at lower points in the hierarchy are absorbed
by reviews higher up. For example, those carrying out a level 4
conceptual review, as part of the review process would be expected
to incorporate all of those tasks which would occur at levels 1e3.
Each of the seven review types are discussed below.
3.2.1. The ‘administrative review’ (level 1)
Acknowledgement of the need for an administrative reviewhierarchy’ for DF.
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forensic science, and Watson and Jones (2013) description on how
to meet the requirements of ISO/IEC standards relevant to DF. An
administrative review focuses on whether the practitioner has
undertaken the correct investigation, followed client's re-
quirements and ultimately completed those tasks on the relevant
exhibits which were required. In most cases, this review is a simple
administrative task and likely to be the least resource-intensive to
implement and quickest to perform.
3.2.2. The ‘proof check’ and ‘sense review’ (levels 2 & 3)
The ‘proof check’ and ‘sense reviews’ are low-labor-intensive
approaches to review, and arguably require limited technical
knowledge to carry out as the reviewer is simply ensuring that the
report is written in a manner which is acceptable. Page et al (2019,
p. 89) define these review types as follows; and this work sees no
reason to expand these formal definitions:
“Sense review: A check of work to ensure it makes sense as a
piece of deliverable evidence. Technically, no checks of evidence
or evaluation take place.”
“Proof check: Here, the work is proofread purely for grammat-
ical and spelling issues.” (Page et al., 2019, p.89, p.89)
These approaches to peer review may be more appealing to
organisations as they come at a relative low cost in terms of
resourcing, but the issue here lies with a potential misunder-
standing of the value and need for peer review. Whilst an expec-
tation of peer review would be to assess the quality of the ‘written
word’, it is at its heart a process of error detection and correction.
Organisations should not consider peer review to be a process that
simply identifies and corrects grammatical errors and poorly
written text (albeit part of the process), the ability to communicate
effectively is a core and essential skill of all DF practitioners
therefore errors at this level should only be minor. The problem is
that ‘proof checks’ and ‘sense reviews’will not effectively scrutinise
work to determine scientific errors, arguably rendering these re-
view types when used in isolation, of limited value to an organi-
sation who seeks to use peer review for quality assurance. Instead,
it is argued that ‘proof checks’ and ‘sense reviews’ should be
absorbed into more rigorous review approaches and form part of a
peer review, but not be considered as the peer review itself. Despite
the fact that ‘proof checks’ and ‘sense reviews’ are easy to imple-
ment, organisations should resist the temptation to consider them
as their primary error checking mechanism, where arguably peer
review mechanism should, as a baseline standard, be at least
reviewing at a ‘conceptual’ (Level 4) peer review level.
3.2.3. The ‘conceptual review’ (level 4)
Moving up the review hierarchy, Page et al (2019, p. 89) define a
‘conceptual peer review’ as follows:
“Conceptual peer review: This type of review focuses on an
individual's description of evidence artefact types, ensuring that
they have documented the true interpretation of what they do.
Here, there is no check on quantification of evidence, the
collection process is assumed to be correct. Instead, it is a check
and evaluation of whether the practitioner has conveyed the
true understanding of specific evidence types.”
Page et al.’s (2019) ‘conceptual peer review’ definition indicates
this review type begins to question the science underpinning the
report, a positive step towards developing a review process which
improves an organisation's chances of error mitigation in7
practitioner work. However, this review also starts to provide an
organisational burden. To assess evidence descriptions and in-
terpretations requires understanding, knowledge and expertise.
Whilst the conceptual peer review description offered by Page et al.
(2019) does not state it, it appears implied (and this work would
like to provide backing to this position) that those conducting
conceptual peer reviews will almost certainly have to be more
experienced (or in a worst case scenario, of equal experience) than
the principal examiner in order to be in a position to provide
effective scrutiny. As a result, this form of peer review is potentially
more costly in time and resources as it requires senior staff to
conduct the review and additional time to assess the report's
content at a ‘technical meaning’ level. Despite improving the
thoroughness of the review process, arguably the conceptual peer
review does not go far enough in terms of being an effective peer
review. Conceptual peer review is an extensive peer review based
on the practitioner's documentation derived from the analysis. This
means that the reviewer cannot replicate experimental methods or
data, and must use their professional and scientific expertise to
determine if the documented experimental design, methods, re-
sults and conclusions appear valid.3.2.4. The ‘sampled & full verification review’ (levels 5 & 6)
At the verification review stage, this work proposes a deviation
from that noted by Page et al (2019, p. 89) who define a ‘verification
review’ as follows:
“Verification review: A full validation review is in essence a
second examination carried out across the principal examiners
data set only, not all of the acquired digital data, with prior
knowledge of the primary practitioners' results set. It allows
steps to be re-traced, hypotheses to be confirmed and findings
to be validated. In doing so, the chance of misinterpretation is
arguably lessened.”
The described ‘verification’ peer review focuses on an evaluation
of the practitioner data set (data and files recovered or parsed and
deemed evidential). In essence, the verification review examines
the practitioner's dataset that has been identified as part of the
investigation. In doing so the reviewer can scrutinise a practition-
er's interpretation of data to a greater degree by being able to look
back at the original data and form their own judgement. This very
process helps to identify errors arising from a ‘non-technical’
source (essentially, the practitioner - all forms noted previously in
Section 2.2), but may do very little in the way of identifying tech-
nical errors as such errors will have occurred prior to the generation
of the dataset which a reviewer is reviewing. Nevertheless, verifi-
cation reviews do expose the practitioners work to a greater degree
of scrutiny, but their implementation requires more effort. To re-
view actual investigative work carried out by the practitioner
(albeit likely a smaller subset of data than the total size of all
exhibited data), this does require time and effort. There will be an
inevitable slowing of the turnover of work carried out by practi-
tioners within the lab setting, where a bottleneck at the reviewing
stage may begin to be witnessed, particularly in smaller organisa-
tions who may be reliant on a small number of employees who are
qualified enough to carry out a verification review (or which this
itself may cause issues if there are not enough staff members in an
organisation for the distribution of reviewer responsibilities).
This article proposes to split the verification stage into two, a
‘Sampled’ and a ‘Full Verification Review’. The difference here lies
with the resources it takes to carry out this process, where sampled
review is arguably less burdensome, but not as robust in terms of a
peer review method.
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Finally, the proposal of a re-examination review is possibly
considered the ‘gold standard’ and is described by Page et al (2019,
p. 89) as:
“Re-examination: A complete re-examination of the original
case and cross-referencing of results. The process is completed
blind, followed by a comparative review and discussion of
findings between the primary and reviewer's investigation.
Such a process is utilised in other forensic science disciplines to
combat forms of cognitive bias and therefore offers potential
benefit to DF. Yet the resource overheads in terms of time and
cost may make this option unfeasible.”
A blind re-examination by a suitably qualified practitioner fol-
lowed by a ‘comparative review and discussion of findings between
the primary and reviewer's investigation’ is possibly one of the
most robust mechanisms of peer review. Yet, the costing impact for
organisations means that in the field of DF, this approach is likely to
be infeasible to consider. It may be argued that such an approach is
not required as the opposing party (prosecution/defense) carries
out such scrutiny, yet it is difficult to support this stance. In addi-
tion, in some jurisdictions those operating in a defense capacity are
not permitted to have access to all of the original case data,
therefore effectively removing the option for carrying out a re-
examination, and in essence are limited to a verification-styled
examination of the practitioner's findings. Whilst some in-
vestigations in more traditional forms of forensic science may
involve tests, which are quick to run and analyse results, in DF,
examinations of data can take multiple days or weeks. The re-
running of such processes followed by the time it takes a second
practitioner to examine and interpret this data will in almost all
cases be too expensive to implement, leading to many organisa-
tions compromising from a review which falls in line with those
previously noted as further down the review hierarchy.
The DF investigation would never operate on its own. The work
would be commissioned by the prosecution/investigation team,
and the starting point would be a mandate or task description. This
should also be the starting point when deciding the scope of the
peer review.Fig. 2. The advice and peer review st
8
All of the stated peer review forms above (except re-
examination) focus on an end goal, that of the reported findings.
Whilst in some sense this appears logical and efficient to approach
peer review in this way, it is argued that this is not the ideal
process. Such a process is reactive, and whilst this is somewhat the
goal of peer review (to react and evaluate work post-completion),
it is argued that it is better to prevent errors than simply detect
them.
An acknowledgement must also be made with regards to the
natural peer review, which takes place in many jurisdictions in
regards to the prosecution/defence relationship. Prosecution evi-
dence is often scrutinized by defence experts to ensure a fair legal
process. In England and Wales, initiatives such as Streamlined
Forensic Reporting (SFR) encourage discourse between both pros-
ecution and defence experts in an effort to agree findings or
identify points of conflict. This process carries an inherent level of
scrutiny and review of the investigatory process where legal obli-
gations exist on both parties to support the court in their pursuance
of justice. In essence, in absence of any formalised peer review
initiative, a fallback position may be considered to be this rela-
tionship between parties. However, it is argued that this is not
wholly an acceptable position to be in where defence experts may
not always be best positioned or effectively resourced to carry out
effective scrutiny. As a result, we argue for the purpose of quality
assurance and control that internal peer review processes should
also exist, without placing the sole burden on the defence to
discover errors.
4. Taking things one step further
During the investigative journey of a typical case, the practi-
tioners usually drive the examination process on their own up until
the point where they believe they have completed their examina-
tion. This work argues that this reactive approach to peer review
may not provide the most efficient approach. Therefore, it is pro-
posed that peer review structures must extend into the investiga-
tive process in order to support the practitioner from the start of
their casework. Fig. 2 provides an overview over the DF investiga-
tion process where the supervision and advice is included prior to
the subsequent review stage.ages of the investigative journey.
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ported in their investigative decision making at all stages of their
cases and that these decisions are exposed to evaluation, prevent-
ing any errors early in the investigative process from impacting
later work. As a result, peer review should not be confined to the
last stage of an examination's journey but form part of a method-
ology which contains ‘advice’ stages earlier in the process and
throughout each stage of an investigation up until the point of
submitting work for review.
In Part 2 (Sunde and Horsman, 2020), the authors offer the
Phase-oriented Advice and Review Structure (PARS) for the peer
review of digital forensic investigations. PARS is a methodology for
peer reviewwhich wraps itself around the DF investigatory process
combining advice checkpoints and peer review to provide a robust
and holistic approach for assessing the quality of practitioner case
work and error detection.
5. Conclusion
Peer review mechanisms across all fields and areas have always
maintained critics, with the same being true here in DF. What is
important to note is that peer review is an important mechanism
for DF organisations and it should not be discarded or treated with
disdain. We recognise that implementing effective peer review
carries a resource burden, but it is argued that this is worth it to
ensure quality standards in a given laboratory are maintained. Peer
review is arguably the gatekeeper for most organisations, pre-
venting potential erroneous and therefore damaging work from
returning to clients and entering legal systems. It is therefore vital
that peer review systems are not only in place, but that they are
sufficiently rigorous in design and implementation to prevent them
from being offered only as a token gesture.
This work has set out the need for peer review in DF, and the
benefits that it can bring to the field in terms of quality assurance
and error mitigation. The contributions noted here in Part 1 are
threefold:
1. An evaluation of the error sources in DF, both technical and non-
technical.
2. A critical evaluation of peer review as a concept, in the context of
DF, highlighting its potential pitfalls and flaws.
3. The ‘Peer Review Hierarchy’ is offered, building upon the past
work of Page et al. (2019), which offers and defines seven levels
of peer review which can be applied to a practitioner's findings.
In this piece, we have discussed the various approaches to peer
review available for evaluating presented findings in a practitioner
report. The ‘Peer Review Hierarchy’ outlines seven methods of peer
review, which range in depth and practicality, where an organisa-
tion can determine which best fits their operating practices. Yet we
also emphasise that the actual review of a practitioner's report itself
should only form part of an effective peer review process. Proposals
are made for the need for a peer review methodology which is
structured, documentable, and one which not only evaluates any
presented findings, but also offers an advisory role throughout the
investigation process and accountability for all those involved in it.
It is here that we offer the Phase-oriented Advice and Review
Structure (PARS) for DF investigations (Sunde and Horsman, 2020),
which is presented and discussed in Part 2.
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